Long, boring, senseless Marxist and/or Randian
screeds to braue@ratsnest.win.net.
Those I actually bother to read may have the names and addresses of their
authors printed here; fair warning.
Palestine never
The big thing in the blogosphere appears to be the decision of Israel's Likud party's central committee that there shall not be a Palestinian state (see the BBC story, the Ha'aretz story, and the AP story).
One thing that does not appear to be noted, though, are Netanyahu's words as reported by Ha'aretz:
Netanyahu said that he supported an entity that allowed the Palestinians to govern themselves, but opposed granting them all of the rights that come with statehood - such as maintaining an army and acquiring weapons - because such a state would threaten Israel.
"Self rule - 'Yes'; state - 'No,'" Netanyahu said.
Now, in my opinion, Netanyahu is appealing too much to formalism here; the Palestinian Authority is such an entity, but it had no difficulty in illicitly acquiring military-grade weaponry. Still, Netanyahu is correct that maintaining military force is an acknowledged right of an independent state, and is further correct (in my opinion, and not in mine alone) that a Palestinian entity's so doing would be an intolerable threat to Israel. In essence, he is saying that Israel ought to go back to the status quo ante intifadam, arguing that, though that state of things may not have been very good, it was the best obtainable under the current circumstances.
I believe that this, more than anything else, places the ball squarely in the court of Palestinian supporters and sympathizers. There is such a plethora of supra-, quasi-, and non-governmental organizations -- a minute fraction of which are equipped with any armed force -- that I think that those people (as Robert E. Lee used to like to call the Yankees) would have an insurmountable obstacle in arguing from general principles why there should not be one more (they can still argue, of course, that a reformed Palestinian Authority would be a special case). Moreover, many of those people are (theoretically) anti-violence and pro-universal government; a Palestinian Authority with the powers of an American state, but not those that are possessed only sovereign entities, would be a proving ground for their assertions and theories.
Let the next step be taken, and let it be either the acceptance of a non-sovereign Palestinian entity, or an explanation of just why that won't work.
Doubting Thomas has written an essay attacking U.S. support (and Pejman Yousefzadeh's support for that support) for dictators such as Somoza, Mohammed Pahlavi, Pinochet, etc.
To identify Thomas with the loony Left would be a grave error. He would vehemently deny it himself, I believe, and, whilst I might less vehement in defending him (partly through my nature), I wholeheartedly agree that he does not deserve to be tarrred by that brush. Note that he has denounced Chomsky in a way that I, for one, find quite convincing.
Nonetheless, I believe that Thomas has been led astray in his article by Leftist propaganda and myth (and Pejman has gone overboard in his defense of U.S. actions abroad, probably in an attempt to counter that same propaganda).
First, let me deal briefly with the area in which I am essentially in complete agreement with Thomas: our support of Somoza was unconsciable. The most that can be said for the man is that he wasn't a Communist. The same, however, could have been said for many other men and women who would have been far better for Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan people. A certain amount of blindness through incomplete information, and of error through the same, is acceptable, even inevitable in this imperfect world, but our support for Somoza went far beyond this point. We owe Nicaragua a deep apology for this; and whilst the U.S. has been skirting around the edges of the issue for decades, trying to admit error without actually acknowledging it, we must stop doing so, and admit our mistakes openly and directly.
On the matter of Pinochet, though, I think that it is Thomas who is in error. For nearly thirty years, the Left has been building the myth of Allende as a progressive democrat with deep and wide popular support, who was overthrown by the evil Pinochet in a coup backed solely by the U.S.
Such propaganda overlooks such matters as Allende's close victory (which -- despite the criticism of Left in the matter of Bush's victory -- makes neither him nor that election any less democratic, but which does show the limits of his popular support), the March of the Empty Pots, the Tancazo, and the anti-democratic and unconstitutional actions of his supporters and his apparatus. The one matter for which the U.S. can be criticized is the assassination of General Schneider, although here it can be pled (some pleading is required) that the CIA did not know of or intend such an outcome of his kidnapping.
It is also Leftist propaganda that the U.S. could have, anywhere and anytime, not only overthrown who it liked but also replaced him with who it liked. Such an outcome could have been approximated in Nicaragua, which was certainly ruled by an American puppet regime (the Somozas) essentially wholly dependent on American support. The coup in Chile, however, was a home-grown affair; Pinochet, Leigh, Prats, and other military officers were highly popular there (remember that Prats put down the Tancazo essentially single-handedly), and trying to opppose them by setting up a figurehead through another coup would have been futile, and opposed by the Chilean people themselves.
As for the coup against Mossadegh, I cannot comment with any certainty. It is certain true that the Pahlavis were Westernizers is much the same mold as Atatürk (who, it should be noted, was no democrat himself), but Mossadegh was also a Westernizer, albeit in a different mold. My assumption is that Pejman has better sources than Thomas does, but it is an easily refuted assumption. My only real objection here is again to the (implicit) assumption that we have could have deposed both Mossadegh and Mohammed Pahlavi, and replaced them with with who we liked.
Wagimoko got back from Round One of her weekly shopping with a pound and a half of coffee (I told her to get extra, since we ran out). I've ground a half a cup of the beans -- the smell alone was sufficient to help wake me -- and I hear the coffeemaker gurgling in the end of the brewing cycle. Shortly, fresh coffee for me! Wagimoko has gone out to continue her shopping; since Sunday is Mother's Day, she's going out after lobsters, plus ribeye steaks for those squicked at the thought of eating what is essentially a very large bug. I don't know if the lobsters will be stuffed and baked, or just plain boiled; we discussed the number and cost of the lobsters (which, since I write the checks, I had to know) but not the means of preparing them (which, since it is no longer safe for me to cook, I dont have to know).
Last night was a bit frought for us (no, no, not that way! rinse out your minds). We both went to bed early, me from general fatigue, and wagimoko since she intends to spend most of the day shopping. Nezumi-chan wasn't quite ready to settle in for the night; much of the early part of our supposed sleep time was disrupted by "Thump!" (as Nezumi-chan jumped off the bed), "Rattle-rattle-crunch-crunch" (as she ate her kibble), and "Bworp!" (as she got back to bed and belched). I finally got her to settle down by putting my good arm around her and my head next to her (one hind foot propped itself up on my jaw) and pretending to go to sleep.
At the moment, however, we're out of coffee, which, in my way of thinking, ranks slightly below "We're out oxygen" as a problem,and well above "We're out of food".
And two new additions (shamefully overdue) to that blogroll:
The first is No Watermelons Allowed, which name its author J. Bowen states was inspired by Warren Brookes' use of the term "watermelon": someone who is Green on the outside, but Red on the inside. I picked the term up myself from the writings of Dr. Petr Beckmann; I know, however, that Beckmann had considerable respect for Brookes and considerable fondness for his writings, so he may well have himself adopted the term from Brookes. In any case, I think that the title speaks for itself.
The second is The Paxety Pages, by J. E. Simmons. His opinions on politics and the media are intelligent (i.e., compatible with mine :) ); more impressive, I think, are his vita, his photographs, and his stories and articles. Anyone (e.g., me) can write; few can write well (not to mention take photographs well). You are missing much if you do not read his blog; you are still missing much if you only read his blog, and not the rest of his site.
Austin Bay of StrategyPage has an interesting take on the Middle East: that it's basically a problem of wealth. (Bay says "money"; I'm confident that my readers know the difference, but I wish to reassure them that I too know the difference). Let economic improvement occur in the Middle East, he suggests, and there will then be real peace; with the exception of a few bin Laden-type fanatics (who, he agrees, must be uprooted by violence), everyone will be too making money to make war.
Well, yes, I'll agree. However, that's rather like the standard leftist "solution" to the problem of war: let everyone put down their guns and get along, and there'll be peace. Very true, but it doesn't tell us how to get from here to there.
Let us dispel the notion that the very real poverty in the Middle East is the result of the Evul Kapitalist Konspiracy or some such. Enough oil money from the West has vanished into the sands of the Persian Gulf that the inhabitants ought to be wiping their asses with hundred-dollar bills.
But, you say, that was then, this is now. Things have, obviously been done wrong in the past, but let them be done correctly in the future.
But, I reply, why should they be done correctly in the future, when the same tyrants who messed things up in the past -- and, more importantly, the same ideologies -- are in control?
Bay offers a telling anecdote, although I do not think that it tells what he wants it to:
Several years ago in Amman, an adviser to King Hussein and I discussed the money process over a long, not for attribution cup of tea. "Economic improvement is the key to escaping our bad situation," he said. And by bad situation he didn't mean simply Jordan and Palestine, but what he saw as the pan-Arab economic failure. "Fine, we keep political structures as they are, but open the borders to trade, to business. Economic liberalization. If we make life better economically for people, that lays the basis for change. In time, the confrontation with Israel will fade."
I argued that Arab autocrats fear such change. In Syria, the Assad clan uses both military might and economic corruption to maintain power. "Damascus won't do it," I said. "Too risky."
"I hear differently from inside Syria," he replied. "I tell you, economic improvement is the only real hope. (Among Palestinians), economic health will restore dignity."
The question instantly arises: why doesn't the Assad clan then economically liberalize? Because they fear that such liberalization would weaken their hold? Or because the mere notion of economic intercourse with the West -- regardless of the actual consequences on the ground -- is enough to inspire jihad against them?
Let us consider China: a nation ruled by vicious gerontocrats who apparently hope that their age will cause them to die of natural causes before they can be bumped off by the next layer down in the nomenklatura. Nonetheless, they decided that China should have something approximating an actual economy, not a command system that produces one billion left shoes for snakes. They have probably succeeded as well as any non-democratic system could (which is not all that well on an absolute basis). Why couldn't the Assads do the same?
No dictator, however nominally absolute, can order his subjects to worship one day what they execrated the previous day -- such fanciful notions should remain where they belong, amidst the ranks of fairy tales. The tyrants of the Arab world have committed themselves to confrontation, not co-operation, with the West. The al-Sa'uds, the Assads, the Arafats, can no more proclaim the economic liberalization of their countries than they could announce their conversions of Mormonism -- and hope to survive. Among Muslims, only someone of the stature of an Atatürk could even try -- and it is persuasive argued that he succeeded to the extent that he did by ignoring his people's history, and the history of their predecessors, all the way back to Constantine I, and annexing the new Turkey to the West.
No one has ever died for a standard of living, let alone someone else's standard of living. Economical liberalization is contingent on the destruction of the anti-Western Islamicist ideology, not vice versa.
An awful lot of powder has been burned in the blogosphere during the past several months concerning the fate of Western civilization, the fate of Islam, whether the U.S.'s perceived unilateralism portends the creation of an American Empire, and similar topics.
Something that should perhaps be better known in the blogosphere than it is is John J. Reilly's Spengler's Future. I have a limited acquiantance with both Spengler's and Reilly's works, although I am in no sense a Spenglerian. Nonetheless, the virtue of Spengler is that his work, although by no means "accessible" in the usual sense of that word, allows a quantitative and (nominally) objective assessment of the likely future of Western civilization.
Reilly has made that assessment. Go read his work. Even if you do not believe a word of it, you should still read it, that you may refute it. Don't overlook his other writings, either.
Fortuyn’s assassin has apparently been arrested. It is said that he is a Green, and, of course, the Green parties and organizations have issued statements disassociating themselves from the killing.
Forgive me for what may seem an overly cynical attitude, but in the US I have seen the ALF and ELF operate with reckless disregard for loss of life, whilst groups such as PETA and the NRDC say, "Of course we don’t condone such extreme actions…although we understand how not getting their (and our) ways could inspire them (nudge, nudge, wink, wink)".
Fortuyn’s death ought not to be the excuse for a witch hunt. The assassin may well be entirely self-motivated. But, with the continual attempts to demonize Fortuyn, the Dutch authorities may wish to demonstrate that they are not mere pawns in the hands of the European left, in and out of politics.
From a multitude of sources comes word that right-wing Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn has been assassinated. Details are sketchy to non-existent, but the smart money is that the assassination is politically motivated; when you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras.
I think that the most surprising, albeit obviously sarcastic, reaction is Glenn Reynolds':
I thought that such shootings only took place in the uncivilized United States, with its bloody-minded Frontier approach to things.
At the cost of perhaps being mocked for missing the point, and without meaning any insult to Professor Reynolds, I would suggest that any sincerity in this reaction can only come from not taking a good modern European history course. During the life of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), more than 400 left-wing politicians were assassinated by right-wing killers, a rate even greater than that of Jenin in producing suicide bombers.
To say this is not to say that a coterie of the anti-democratic left and Islamofascists in Europe are planning to guarantee that the EU nations fall squarely in the pro-terror column, despite the wishes of their peoples and regardless of the cost. It does suggest to me, however, that this is a European problem, and that, if our help be requested by any nation on the far side of the pond save the UK (for the moment we will ignore the question of whether the UK is a European nation or not), it be provided if at all with a meaningful price tag, unlike in 1917 and 1941.
Glenn Reynolds' link Steven Den Beste's link Kathy Kinsley's link Andrew Ian Dodge's link
It should be noted that this does not purport to be a complete list; these are just links I noticed among the blogs that I read regularly.
I don't know if you saw my reply to Rand Simberg on that "letter" from a Palestinian he posted [link here -- JB]. But check out this article at the Arab News from early April:
And ask yourself -- why was this sent to a travel agents' newsletter?
Well, the answer to that question is obvious -- some thug thought it was an worthwhile and unobvious outlet for his propaganda.
I don't think that Rand Simberg knew this; I certainly didn't. And I think that in the absence of that knowledge, our attitudes towards it were correct. But, now that Charles has found the source, there can no longer be any question but that it is anti-Semitic propaganda, to be denounced as such and then ignored.
I was wrong in giving it the benefit of the doubt.
Is it better to have loved and lost, than to have never loved at all? Wend your way through this article, reader, whilst I attempt to put my thoughts in order (I will do myself the honor of supposing that I have thoughts). Perhaps I shall make a remark or two worth hearing, even if I don’t reach a conclusion.
Why do we love? I don’t mean the physio-chemical mechanism, the neural structures behind it all, but what are we trying to accomplish by it? It seems to me that we are looking for value in another person. The words, "This is the person I want to spend my life with", trite as they may seem, are actually an expression of what we seek in love: the qualities of that person, which we value, are so great that we wish to have those qualities (and that person who expresses them) near to us forever.
Now "which we value" is an important part of this. It is perfectly possible for a person to express qualities that we do not value; as a consequence, we will not love that person. We usually do not even note those qualities, save perhaps with contempt or disgust. I do not demand that we should appreciate those qualities, or find in them the basis for love; merely to acknowledge that they are there. The true "man without qualities" is a rare bird indeed.
Of course, there can be a range in this. I may not wish to spend my life with a person, but may wish to spend one evening a week or a month with him or her, drinking beer or going out to a rock concert. To use the same, "love", in the sentences, "I love apple pie", "I love partying with Mary", "I love screwing Mary", and "I love Mary like no man has loved a woman since time began"1, is not an error forced on us by a lack of proper terminology, but expressive of the different forms that love can take.
An aside here, let me speak of physical love – sex. We all pretend to denigrate this, exclaiming, "Oh, it’s just a physical attraction", and nodding sagely at each other as we denounce how shallow it is to act this way. On the other hand, men and women both pay for escorts who at least look like they’d be good in the sack – not for ones who can plausibly imitate world-famous economists, or tender and caring step-parents, or charming and witty people with great personalities. This leads me to believe that, in most people’s minds, having a great sex life is perhaps more important than they’d like us to think. To pretend that the physical aspect of love – not only having hot monkey sex, but with a partner who others think is worth having hot monkey sex with – is unimportant may be a case of sour grapes.
So, then, what when your true love ceases to show those qualities that you value? We are all familiar, whether or not through personal experience, with the indignant and discarded lover who exclaims, "I thought you loved me, not my breast implants/trust fund/Nobel prize/fill in the blank". Even worse, perhaps, is the jilter who tells the jiltee, "You’re good in the sack/kitchen/drawing room/office. but So-and-so is great". What then?
This leads to the problem of unrequited love. That I find you my true soulmate is no guarantee that you will find me yours2. Of course, unrequited love can be overcome. The steps are:
Decide who you would like to love you
Find out who he or she wants to love
Become that person
Step 1 is almost trivial (although is probably futile to answer it "Brad Pitt" or "Christy Turlington"). Step 2 is a little harder, but a reasonable amount of research will provide an answer. Step 3 can be very hard indeed, and the usual demurral is, "But I want to be loved for who I am!"
Of course, there is not necessarily a reason why you should be loved for who you are; aside from the tastes of your chosen target, you may not be a particularly loveable person at all3. People who say this are often soft of spirit, lounging around and demanding that someone – anyone – love them ("anyone" will do until someone better comes along, at which point the former lover will be dropped like a hot potato), despite the fact that they have changed all out of recognition over time.
So, is it better to have loved and lost, than to have never loved at all? I still don’t know; you tell me. I maunder; you decide.
1Which is almost certainly not true, but we all like to hear it, don’t we? 2Indeed, I would suggest that if you do find me yours, you’re in need of some kind of psychiatric treatment. 3Be sure to have plenty of Bactine, bandages, and splints handy if you take this tack face-to-face. A woman once hit me with a vodka bottle when I told her…but that’s another article.
OK, that doing her a disservice. She's literate, and admits up front she has nothing relevant to say. If you like reading people's personal journals on the web, read this one. If you don't, don't.
William Quick at DailyPundit notes that he has burned one hand in an accident and may go on hiatus for a day or so.
I can sympathize with him; one-handed hunt-and-peck is not my favored style of typing either, although in my case not typing so would mean that I would never write again (there are not lacking those who would think this a good thing).
In William's case, I hope that his hand heals quickly for both our sakes (his so that he can write, and mine so that I can read what he has written :) ).
I believe that a considerable portion of the blogosphere owes him an apology for their reaction to this report.
Simberg made it quite that he does not accept the e-mail as gospel. Moreover, he does consider both sides of the question, and in his remarks, makes it clear that he is speaking of hypotheticals. Nonetheless, Christopher "Spoons" Kanis, Ralph Phelan, and Eric Pobirs pile on in comments, criticizing him for being too easily suckered. They appear to be wrong, as it is patently obvious from reading Simberg’s post that he was not suckered.
Now, Simberg does protest his skepticism a bit too much for my taste. This could be, though, the difference between discussing this e-mail as an isolated incident, and as one more in a constant stream of anti-Israel lies and libels. In the former context, Simberg is correct that it should be treated as neither truth or lie, that judgment should be suspended until more information is forthcoming (in effect, treating it as false, although without condemning any person or group for originating or disseminating it). In the latter context, I think that Phelan is correct, that "Palestinian" spokesmen have already told so many lies that the burden of proof is firmly on them, that nothing that they say should be taken seriously unless and until they provide solid evidence to back their claims.
In this case, however, Simberg, though not entirely correct IMO, has hold of by far the greater part of the stick, and we should treat him as such.
A little while back I commented that "The question of how far I should be expected to go to look after your rights and privileges will be the topic of a future article". This is that article – or at least it may become so. I find that I have a good deal to ramble on about before I get there, and may in fact never arrive.
I note in the article below that I am not a libertarian. Now, the label "libertarian" covers a multitude of sins. Everyone from anarcho-capitalists to constitutional democrats seems to like to latch on to this label. It’s what being an "activist" was in the 60s – except that libertarians bathe more often.
The First (and, I think, Only) Commandment to libertarians is: Thou Shalt Not Initiate Force. The definition of "initiating force" gets a little weird out on the anarcho-capitalist fringe – is defrauding me an "initiation of force", particularly if I have not explicitly paid for reliable information? – but it’s possible to construct a set of circumstances that all self-styled libertarians agree is at least an improper subset of "initiating force", and which is recognizable as such to non-libertarians as well.
It should be noted at this point that confusion exists in the public mind between "libertarianism" and "anarchism". Larry Niven says that his short story "Cloak of Anarchy" is his statement as to why he’s not a libertarian. As much as I dislike (publicly) disagreeing with Mr. Niven, it is not – it is his statement of why he is not an anarchist. Not all libertarians are anarchists, and not all anarchists are libertarians.
Where libertarians run into problems is with the State (insert ominous music here). All agree that an organization to which one voluntarily adheres has a (limited) right to coerce certain behavior from one. The difficulty is with an organization that one does not voluntarily adhere to – the State, by any other name, is just as oppressive, they feel – and which coerces behavior from one – specifically, the paying of taxes. We get various unrealistic "solutions" to this problem; from the "minarchist" declaration that the State is a necessary evil (tantamount to saying, "We have no idea how to resolve this dilemma") to anarcho-capitalists denying that the State is necessary, although it is certainly evil ("How many divisions do you need to defend Taiwan from the PRC?" "None; the market will take care of that").
This, incidentally, provides one range of answers to the question, "To what extent must I defend your rights?" Anarcho-capitalists declare that the anarcho-capitalist society will spontaneously evolve institutions capable of doing so. I would point out that this has happened so seldom in human history as to be discounted entirely. Anarchists like to point to pre-English Ireland and the Icelandic Commonwealth as two examples of such societies. In the first instance, though, that society proved utterly incapable of defending itself from the machinations of a few Anglo-Norman knights (not England itself; Henry II intervened when it became likely that the Irish Normans who do to him what he was trying to do to Capetian France). In the second instance, Icelandic society tore itself apart in feuds between wealthy clans, so that they eventually submitted voluntarily to the Norwegian king as an alternative. It should be mentioned here that concentration of wealth is a problem that libertarians prefer not to deal with --- many denying that it is a problem – although the examples constructed by non-libertarians are often no more realistic than the libertarian Utopia itself.
Where then do we find the answer? I suggest that one place to look is in the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, particularly the Discourses (it has truly been said that who has only read The Prince has not read Machiavelli).
Machiavelli was an ardent republican, although he admitted that there were circumstances in which it was necessary for a "prince" (a man who steps outside of conventional forms, especially political ones) to refound or reform the State. His vision of republicanism was very different from ours, of course. Among others things, he thought the State could only survive where the citizenry (not, in his view, synonymous with the entire population of the State) was possessed of virtù. Virtù was one of Machiavelli’s favorite words; he used it in a variety of ways, not always compatible with each other. In respect to the qualities necessary to the citizens of a free, republican state, however, it can be translated as "civic spiritedness": the determination by the citizens that the State should remain free and republican, that no citizen should unjustly be deprived of his political, civic, or property rights, that the State should present a united face to outsiders, no matter how much the citizens squabbled among themselves when they had leisure to do so.
Again, let me note here that Machiavelli was a devotee of the political theory, promulgated by Aristotle, that good and bad forms of "pure" government would alternate in cyclical fashion in a state. Monarchy would be succeeded by tyranny; it would be overthrown by aristocracy, which would degenerate into oligarchy; the people would rise up and replace it with a democracy, which then would be torn asunder by competing demagogues; the most powerful demagogue would make himself king; and the cycle would repeat. The difference is that Aristotle seems to have believed that "mixed" government, a republic (of course the word was introduced into political philosophy after his time), would be internally stable. Machiavelli considered that, although it would be more stable than a "pure" form of government, the citizens would eventually and inevitably lose virtù, give way to ozio (sloth), and the State would then be open to the machinations of would-be tyrants. It is to a considerable extent that Machiavelli (implicitly) justifies his republicanism by the virtù of the citizens; it is safe to include aristocrats (ottomati) and even monarchic power (regia potestà) in the State because the citizens, filled with virtù, have one eye on them (and one hand on their daggers).
Then, in this long-winded way, we come to an answer to the question, "To what extent should I care about another’s rights?" Machiavelli’s answer would be, "You must care about another citizen’s rights absolutely, even to the extent that you give your life for them; but not everyone born in the same State as you is your fellow citizen".
The Old Miss Conservative explains why sending a libertarian to talk a jumper out of committing suicide is a bad idea (link courtesy of Susanna Cornett).
And, although I am not a libertarian ("Machiavellian republican" fits me much better; go ye and read the Discourses), I still, disturbingly, got hits from two different IP address on "how to commit suicide". Yes, I've been there, a number of times, and expect to be there again in the future, but I don't think I've blogged on it (aside from a couple of references to my wakizashi; if you are contemplating seppuku, let me note that it hurts like Hell).